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Autonomy-based theories hold that enforceable
contracts require the knowing and voluntary consent of
the parties. In defining "knowing" and "voluntary,"
however, autonomy theorists have paid little attention
to the remedy that will be granted if consent is round to
be lacking, or to the question of what obligations (if
any) will be enforced in place of the unconsented-to
contract. In this paper, I expand on Michael
Trebilcock's argument that considerations of
institutional competence-specifically, the relative
ability of courts and private actors to craft acceptable
substitute obligations-should sometimes play a key
role in defining what counts as "knowing" and
"voluntary" consent.
Selon la thdorie autonomiste, le contrat cst executoire
lorsque les parties contractantes ont sciemment et
volontairement donn6 leur consentement. Toutefols,
en d6finissant les termes «sciemment- et
«volontairemento, les thoriciens ont peu considdr6les
recours disponibles dans le cas ois le consentement
serait absent, ainsi que l'execution force de certaines
obligations suppletives, nonobstant cc d6faut de
consentement. Dans cet article je ddveloppe
'argument de Michael Trebilcock selon lequel les
questions juridictionelles-tel que la capacit6 des
tribunaux et des organismes prives de formuler des
obligations suppl~tives au contrat-devraient 6tre
consid6r6es dans l'6valuation du caractbre sconscient,
et (<volontairea du consentement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Like Michael Trebilcock, I am a law and economics scholar by
trade. As a result, I share many of his assumptions about the proper
analysis of contract problems. While we do not agree on every point, his
views are probably closer to mine than they are to those of the other
participants in this panel.
This places me in some difficulty, for this panel is billed as a
critique of Professor Trebilcock's book, and most of what I want to say is
extremely flattering. In addition to presenting a series of (for the most
part) sound economic analyses, the book is especially remarkable for the
attention it gives to non-economic theories and for the respect with
which it treats opposing views. This sort of ecumenicism is, I'm afraid,
rather rare among writers on law and economics. Indeed, specialization
has made such broad-mindedness rare among academics of any sort,
regardless of their philosophical or methodological persuasions.
In keeping with the breadth of Professor Trebilcock's own
analysis, I want to talk here about both economic and non-economic
theories. In particular, I want to talk a little about a non-economic,
autonomy-based theory of contracts, and then discuss the relationship
between that theory and Professor Trebilcock's own "pragmatic" focus
on considerations of institutional competence.1 Each of these theories
has something different to say about when a person can be said to
consent to a contract voluntarily and knowingly. My own view is that
these theories can be better understood by focusing on a question
familiar to any practicing lawyer: What is the appropriate remedy?
II. AUTONOMY-BASED THEORIES .
Autonomy-based theories, as defended by writers such as
Charles Fried,2 hold that the ability to freely choose one's obligations is
an important aspect of political and moral freedom, and that a system of
private ordering can therefore be justified without regard to whatever
economic efficiencies might be produced by such a system. On this view,
1 MJ. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1993) at 101 [hereinafter Freedom of Contract].
2 C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1981). See also R.E. Barnett, "A Consent Theory of Contract" (1986) 86 Colum.
L. Rev. 269, and "The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent" (1992) 78 Va. L.
Rev. 821; and R.A. Epstein, "Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal" (1975) 18 J.L. & Econ.
293.
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the enforceability of any particular contractual obligation is a moral
issue which turns on whether the party allegedly subject to that
obligation .has truly consented to it. If he did not consent, it would
infringe his freedom to enforce the contract against him; while if he did
consent, it might be just as much of an infringement not to enforce the
contract 3
Significantly, though, not just any form of "consent" will do to
bind a party under this theory. Instead, the consent must be voluntary,
and under most conceptions of autonomy the consent must also be
adequately informed. For example, if someone signs a contract but does
so only because the other party holds a gun to his head, no autonomy
theorist would say that the first party had consented in any meaningful
way. The same would apply if the first party had been tricked into
signing the contract-for example, if the other party had lied about what
the contract said. Thus, if enforceability is to turn on the presence or
absence of meaningful consent, an autonomy theorist must develop
criteria to tell when an apparent instance of consent was not really
voluntary or when it was not adequately informed.
One of this book's contributions is that it canvasses the vast
range of problems that must be addressed in any attempt to define
"voluntary" (and "informed") consent. It might seem obvious that a
party's choice is not really voluntary if he is threatened with being shot
unless he signs the contract, as in Trebilcock's "highwayman" 
example.4
But what if the complaining party is a shipowner who, as a result of a
natural storm, is threatened with losing his ship unless he signs a
contract with the only tug in a position to rescue it (Trebilcock's
"foundering ship" cases). Or what if he is an avid collector who is
threatened with having to do without a desired stamp unless he agrees to
the current owner's terms (the "penny black" case
6)? Or what if he is a
poor consumer threatened with having to do without some product
unless he agrees to the standard form contract used by all sellers in his
neighborhood (Trebilcock's "single mother on welfare" caseT)? Further
variations are possible in most of these cases-for example, the seller
3 See Fried, ibid at 20-21 (arguing that if the law refused to enforce a freely undertaken
obligation, it would fail to respect the promisor's status as a responsible moral agent). 
For
convenience in the use of pronouns, all of my examples will involve a male -'ho wants to get out of 
a
contractual obligation and a female who wants the obligation to be enforced.
4 Freedom of Contract, supra note 1 at 84.
51bid at 85.
6 Ibid. at 87.
7 Ibid. at 97.
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might be a single monopolist or a group of sellers who compete
vigorously, and the products might be either frivolous goods or
necessities. In the foundering ship case, there might be one ship in
jeopardy or several (perhaps more than the tug can save), and the threat
might be to the lives of the passengers or merely to the ship's cargo.
The proper analysis of such cases has long been debated by
philosophers as well as by lawyers. As Trebilcock discusses, some argue
that hard choices make a contract coercive (in a morally objectionable
way) only if the alternative to signing the contract would violate some
legal or moral right of the threatened party. Under this approach, a
substantive theory of rights is needed to decide which of these cases is
truly coercive.8 Others suggest that a contract could be considered
coercive if the alternative to signing would leave the threatened party (a)
worse off than he would in fact have been left if the contract had not
been offered (a "statistical" baseline), regardless of whether he had any
right not to be left in that state; or (b) worse off than he subjectively
expected to be left if the contract had not been offered (a
"phenomenological" baseline), again regardless of whether he had any
right not to be left in that state.9 Trebilcock's own suggestion, which he
offers somewhat tentatively, is to ask whether the only alternative to
signing would leave the threatened party worse off than if he had never
encountered the other party1 0
In the end, though, Trebilcock is not really concerned with
defending any general or overall test for coercion. Instead, he takes a
more eclectic approach which treats each example on its own terms, and
argues for or against enforceability based on factors which vary from
example to example. To be sure, he does suggest some general rules of
thumb, such as his recommendation that courts intervene in cases of
"situational" monopolies but not in cases of "structural" monopolies.11
In making these recommendations, however, Trebilcock relies very little
on his (or any other) theoretical definition of coercion, and quite a bit
on what he calls "pragmatic considerations of institutional
competence." 12 As he puts it elsewhere in the book, sometimes the most
8 For example, R. Nozick, "Coercion" in S. Morganbesser, P. Suppes & M. White, eds.,
Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1969) 440 at 440.
9 For more on all three baselines, see A. Wertheimer, Coercion (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987).
10 Freedont of Contract, supra note 1 at 84 (discussing what he terms a "literal Paretian" test).
11 Ibid. at 93-95, and 101. I discuss this recommendation below in Part VI.
12 Ibid. at 101.
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an analyst should aspire to is "muddling through.
'13
I agree with Trebilcock's intuition that the enforceability of many
contracts should not turn simply on answers to the questions, Was the
objecting party's consent voluntary? and Was his consent sufficiently
informed? That is, I share Trebilcock's conclusion that the questions
posed by the autonomy-based theory of contracts are not very helpful in
deciding on the enforceability of a large class of contracts. However, I
think that more can be said about just why these questions are
inadequate, and about what questions ought to take their place.
4 In the
remainder of these comments, I will attempt to elaborate this point by
asking what remedy autonomy theorists would recommend for cases
where voluntary consent is lacking.
Before turning to the question of remedy, however, a preliminary
point must be disposed of. At times in the book, Professor Trebilcock
suggests that he may share the basic premise of the autonomy-based
theories (i.e., the premise that the enforceability of a contract should
normally turn on the voluntariness of the objecting party's consent).
Indeed, Trebilcock even provides what might seem to be a convincing
economic justification for this premise. Noting that one economic
reason for respecting voluntary exchanges is that they can be presumed
to increase each party's welfare, Trebilcock points out that the
presumption of a welfare increase may not be valid if one party entered
the transaction involuntarily.1 5 If one is concerned about increasing
welfare, then, it might seem as though one must come up with a suitable
definition of "voluntary" in order to determine when we can infer that
the parties' welfare has increased.
As an economic argument, though, this is a non sequitur. What is
needed to infer welfare increases from a voluntary transaction is not at
all the same as what is needed to determine whether a party's consent is
truly voluntary. Consider an example that anyone would define as
coercive: the case of a seller who says "sign this contract or I'll shoot."
When the victim responds by signing the contract, an economist can still
make the usual inference that signing the contract increased the victim's
1 3 Ibid. at 126.
14 My own views are set forth at more length in R. Craswell, "Property Rules and Liability
Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines" (1993) 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1.
15 Freedom of Contract, supra note 1 at 17 and 83-84; see also ibid. at 103 (applying a similar
argument to cases of imperfect information). There are, of course, other possible
counterarguments that might be raised against this presumption (see, for example, ibid. c. 7,
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welfare relative to the alternatives then available. After all, the
economist's usual inference (i.e., that an observed choice must have
increased the chooser's welfare) never asserts anything more than that
the chooser's welfare must have increased relative to whatever
alternative the chooser in fact faced. The problem in this example, then,
is not that this inference is invalid but simply that it is unhelpful. From a
normative perspective, we don't really care whether signing the contract
increased the chooser's welfare relative to his getting shot. Instead, what
we care about from a normative perspective is whether the only
alternative then available (getting shot) is the appropriate baseline
against which the voluntariness of the choice ought to be assessed. The
economist's inference that signing the contract must have been better
than getting shot is thus of no help in resolving this issue. In the class of
cases under consideration here, the two tasks-defining coercion and
inferring increases in welfare-have little to do with one another.
III. THE QUESTION OF REMEDY
I turn now to the question that interests me. Under an
autonomy theory of contract, what should be the remedy if a party can
show that he did not voluntarily consent to a contract, or if he can show
that his consent was not sufficiently informed?
While this question is not often addressed by autonomy theorists,
the answer might seem to be obvious. If no person can be held to a
contractual obligation to which he did not consent, any contract which
was not consented to is a moral nullity, so the contract cannot
legitimately be enforced. In other words, when true consent is lacking,
the proper remedy (from an autonomy standpoint) might seem to be
complete rescission of the offending contract, combined with restitution
of any benefits that have changed hands. I will refer to this position as
the "remedial corollary" of the autonomy theory. Under this corollary,
if a seller has forced a buyer to sign a contract at the point of a gun, then
(at a minimum) the buyer should be allowed to return any goods that
have been delivered and get his money back.
Of course, any practicing lawyer knows that undoing a
transaction is not always feasible. However, there are two different
reasons why undoing the transaction may not be an appropriate remedy,
and it is worth distinguishing those reasons here. The first reason is
practical: literally undoing the transaction may be impossible. The
goods may have been consumed, or services may have already been
rendered, and in either case it will be impossible to restore the exact
[VOL. 33 NO. 2
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status quo ante. This problem has obvious practical significance for the
choice of an appropriate remedy-but it is not the problem I want to
focus on here.
The second reason why rescission may not be an appropriate
remedy is that in some cases nobody wants to undo the transaction, even
if it would be possible to do so. That is, while the victim of a gunman
may be happy to return the goods and get his money back, other victims
may not be so eager to undo their coerced transactions. As this point is
less often recognized, it requires some explanation.
Consider a shipowner who has had to pay a huge sum of money
to get his ship rescued during a storm. Even if we decide that the
owner's choices were so constrained that his agreement was not really
voluntary-that is, even if we adopt a philosophical definition of
"coercion" which includes this case-this would hardly establish that it
would be a good idea to undo the coerced transaction and restore the
status quo ante. Restoring the status quo, in this case, would mean
towing the ship back out to sea and placing it in jeopardy once again.
This is hardly the kind of "protection" that the shipowner would
welcome.
A similar analysis applies in the case of a consumer who faces a
monopoly seller, or even a group of competing sellers who all insist on
the same standard form contract. In either case, the consumer's only
choice is to agree to the sellers' terms or to do without the product in
question, so it would certainly be possible to adopt a definition of
coercion which treated such a choice as coerced. (Such a definition
would of course be controversial, but I am not concerned here with
whether that would be the right definition to adopt.) Instead, my point
is that even if we accept that definition of coercion, this would not
establish that we ought to undo the transaction by making the customer
return the product and letting him get his money back. As long as all
other sellers insist on identical terms, the consumer would be no better
off after this remedy than he was before: he would still face the hard
choice of accepting other sellers' terms or doing without the product in
question. In short, in these cases undoing the transaction is not an
appropriate goal even if we agree that the transaction was "coerced."
At this point, it might be objected that there is one sense in
which undoing the transaction might indeed be an acceptable goal, even
in cases such as these. That is, while the owner of a sinking ship clearly
would not want the rescue transaction to be undone permanently, he
might not mind at all if it were undone temporarily. Let us imagine (at
least as a thought experiment) returning the parties to the status quo ante
in which the ship is about to sink and only one tug is in any position to
1995]
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save it. This would be morally problematic if the ship would then be left
to sink, but there is no reason to suppose that would be the result.
Instead, what would probably happen is that the tug company-having
now learned that exorbitant rescue fees will not be enforced-would
offer a more moderate contract, charging a fee sufficient to give it a
normal profit but nothing more. (If the tug company does not lower its
fee enough, that contract too could be rescinded, and the process could
be repeated until the tug company finally gets it right.)
A similar analysis can be applied to the consumer facing sellers
who use oppressive and identical standard forms. That is, we can at least
imagine a regime in which courts keep voiding any one-sided contracts
entered into under these circumstances until, eventually, some seller
figures out that the only way to make her deal stand up is to offer more
reasonable terms. When viewed from this standpoint, an autonomy
theorist could argue that undoing the transaction is an appropriate
remedy in every case where consent is coerced-an appropriate remedy
in principle, that is, leaving only the mundane practical objections in
cases where the goods for some reason cannot be returned.
I believe, however, that there is still an important difference
between (a) undoing a transaction in this temporary sense, and (b)
undoing the transaction in the more permanent sense that would be
appropriate in other cases of coercion. In the two cases just discussed,
the objecting party might be happy to have the deal undone temporarily,
but he would still want it to be consummated eventually on more
favourable terms. As a result, the law's aim in these cases is not to
prevent the two parties from transacting at all, but rather to prevent
them from transacting on unjustifiably one-sided terms. To implement
this remedy, therefore, courts will have to be able to determine the point
at which the terms have stopped being unjustifiably one-sided. In the
sinking ship case, for example, the courts will have to be able to
determine a reasonable price for the tug's rescue service. In the
consumer example, the courts will have to be able to determine what
counts as reasonable warranty terms (or credit terms, or whatever other
aspect of the transaction is challenged by the consumer). Absent such a
determination, the court would have to keep voiding the contracts
forever, since the coercive aspect of the situation-the fact that the only
alternative to signing the contract is letting the ship sink or doing
without the product in question-will always be present. This would
mean that the ship would never get rescued, and the consumer would
216 [VOL 33 No. 2
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never be able to receive the product.
1 6
This need to evaluate a challenged cbntract's substantive terms
marks an important difference in remedies between these two cases, on
the one hand, and the sale induced by a gun, on the other. Specifically,
in the gun case the court can set aside the transaction without worrying
about whether the contract's substantive terms were impermissibly one-
sided. Moreover, it can continue to set aside the transaction (still
without regard to the substantive terms) as long as the seller continues
to use a gun. The court need not worry that this would permanently
block a transaction that in fact would be very useful to the buyer, for if
the seller is willing to offer terms that would be useful to the buyer then
she can always get the buyer to agree to those terms without using a gun,
in which case the transaction would then be upheld. In this example,
then-unlike the case of the foundering ship or the monopoly
seller-there is no reason for the court ever to scrutinize the substantive
terms of the transaction.
17
These examples can be generalized by dividing all cases of
coercion (or arguable coercion) into two categories. In one category,
typified by gun-to-the-head duress, the court can void the coerced
transaction without ever attempting to evaluate the substance of the
challenged contract. The defining characteristic of this category is that it
is within the power of the stronger party to eliminate or correct the
conditions that give rise to the coercion (for example, by refraining from
using a gun). The fact that the stronger party can eliminate the coercion
is what makes it possible for the law to void the transaction vithout
16 Strictly speaking, the court could invalidate every rescue contract (regardless of the
contract's terms) if it then allowed the rescuer to get paid without a contract, by permitting her to
sue in restitution for the reasonable value of her services. However, this still requires a court to
determine the reasonable value of her services, just as it would have to do under a rule which struck
down all contracts except those which charged a reasonable price. While there might perhaps be
symbolic distinctions between these regimes, either would place exactly the same institutional
demands on the court, so I will not distinguish between them for the purposes of my analysis.
17 In gun-to-the-head cases, where the transaction cannot be undone for practical
reasons-for example, if the goods have already been consumed by the buyer-the court might still
have to determine the reasonable value of the goods in order to fix an appropriate remedy in
restitution. However, the law can still adopt prospective sanctions to try to deter such coerced
contracts ex ante, and one way to effect such a sanction is to shade the restitutionary recovery
against the offending seller (thus reducing the importance of strictly accurate determinations). But
the law cannot take this approach when the involuntariness stems from necessity (the foundering
ship case) or irremediable lack of information (consumer credit sales), unless we are willing to deter
all rescue contracts or all consumer credit sales. (The law could perhaps impose penalties on all
rescue contracts or credit salesfound to contain unreasonable substantive terns-but this requires the
courts to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable substantive terms, thus raising all the issues
discussed in the text.)
1995]
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concern for whether the terms of the transaction might be substantively
reasonable (and, thus, without any fear of permanently blocking
desirable transactions). As long as it is possible for the stronger party to
eliminate the coercion, those parties who want to transact on
substantively reasonable terms can to do so by eliminating the coercion
and then getting the buyer's uncoerced consent.
By contrast, in the second category of cases (typified by the
sinking ship example), undoing the transaction without scrutinizing its
substantive terms is not an appropriate goal, even in principle. The
defining characteristic of this category is that, in these cases, it is not
possible for the stronger party to eliminate or correct the factors that
make the situation coercive. In the sinking ship case, for example, the
coercion (if coercion it is) comes from nature, or from the fact that the
ship is sinking and there is only one rescuer in sight. If the court were to
strike down contracts formed in this setting without regard to their
substantive terms, then no contract formed in this setting would ever be
enforceable, and the rescuer could never get paid.
IV. REMEDIES WHEN CONSENT IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
INFORMED
My analysis so far has focused on cases of "coercion," of the sort
discussed in Chapter Four of Professor Trebilcock's book. However, a
similar analysis can also be applied to some of the "asymmetric
information" problems discussed in Chapter Five.
Consider first a case of outright fraud, where the seller lies about
her product (or about the clauses contained in her standard form).
Fraud is wrongful under nearly any philosophical theory, of course, so it
might seem obvious that such a contract ought not to be enforced.
Moreover, this is also a case where the implicit remedial corollary to the
autonomy-based theory seems quite plausible. That is, if one believes
that obligations which were not properly consented to have no moral
force at all, it seems obvious that a contract induced by fraud should be
rescinded and the buyer should be given his money back.
From my point of view, however, what is significant about this
case is that (just as in the case involving the gun) it is within the seller's
power to cure the conditions that makes the buyer's consent invalid: the
seller can simply refrain from fraudulent statements. As a result, a court
can invalidate the resulting contract without any fear that it might be
permanently blocking a desirable transaction, and therefore without any
need to scrutinize the transaction's substantive terms. If the seller thinks
[VOL. 33 NO. 2
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the contract is substantively reasonable, she should be able to go back
and get the buyer's consent without engaging in fraud, so any
substantively reasonable contract will be blocked temporarily at most.
A somewhat harder question is posed in a case of bare
nondisclosure, where the seller never lies about her contract but does
bury a clause in the fine print and never tells the buyer it is there. If the
buyer signs the contract, then learns of (and objects to) the clause later,
should the court void the contract? In particular, should the court void
the contract without regard to the substance of the objectionable clause,
just as it would if the seller had lied about the clause (or if the seller had
forced the buyer to sign at the point of a gun)? An autonomy-based
theory view would treat this question as turning on the nature of
informed consent. Obviously, this would require some test or criteria for
deciding when mere failure to disclose was sufficient to make a party's
consent uninformed, and developing such criteria is not easy.
18 Once
the relevant criteria were developed, however, the remedial corollary of
the autonomy principle would then presumably come into play. That is,
if the failure to disclose was not deemed to negate the buyer's informed
consent, the contract would of course be fully enforceable, while if the
failure to disclose was deemed to negate the buyer's informed consent it
would seem that the contract would then have to be rescinded.
From my point of view, however, this conclusion that the
contract should be rescinded is too quick, even if we assume (at least for
the sake of argument) that nondisclosure does indeed prevent the
buyer's consent from being adequately informed. On my view, further
analysis is needed to decide whether the contract should be rescinded
regardless of its substantive terms, as in the case of outright fraud or
gun-to-the-head duress; or whether it should instead be rescinded only if
its substantive terms are also found to be unreasonable, as in the case of
the foundering ship or the monopoly seller. To give a better sense of
that further analysis, let me discuss this question at more length.
On the one hand, it might be argued that it is within the seller's
power to cure this problem as well. That is, it would certainly have been
possible for the seller to point out the clause. to the buyer before the
buyer signed, thus eliminating any impediment to informed consent.
Indeed, if we believe that sellers ought to point out all such clauses to
buyers before they sign, then this case probably should be treated like a
case of outright fraud, and the contract should be struck down without
regard to its substantive terms. As long as we believe that sellers ought
18 Several possible criteria are surveyed by Trebilcock in Freedom of Contract, supra note 1 at
102-03 and 106-15.
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to point out all such clauses, it is not at all unreasonable to ask any seller
who thinks her terms are reasonable to get the buyer's informed
agreement after she has pointed the terms out to him. On this view,
then, the courts should strike down any and all contracts whose terms
have not been pointed out, and they can do so without worrying that
such a rule might block important transactions.1 9
On the other hand, it is not obvious that we want sellers to point
out every clause to buyers before they sign. Pointing out clauses takes
time, and explaining the significance of the clause (so that the buyer's
consent can be truly informed) may take even more time. If the contract
is a long one with complicated terms-say, a twenty-page insurance
contract2 0-a full explanation of every clause might take two or three
days. Most buyers would not be willing to sit through this long an
explanation before buying insurance; and it is probably not socially
desirable for them to do so. While it is laudable to be an informed
consumer, there are many other laudable things people can do with their
time, and it would be a narrow view indeed that placed "becoming
informed about insurance contracts" at the very top of this list. More
generally, while there might be some kinds of contracts (or some kinds
of consumers) for which it was worth taking whatever time was needed
for a full explanation, surely there are some kinds of contracts (or some
kinds of consumers) where spending this much time is not worthwhile.
Thus, even when it is within a seller's power to correct the conditions that
vitiate buyers' informed consent, if the costs of doing so are high enough
then we may not want to induce this kind of correction.
Significantly, whenever we decide we do not want sellers to fully
explain every clause, the problem then begins to look like the second
category of cases discussed earlier. That is, we can still decide that a
buyer has not truly consented to any clause which was not fully explained
to him-this will depend on our philosophical theory of informed
consent-but we now have to recognize that, even if informed consent is
lacking, it is a lack that cannot (or, at least, should not) be corrected by
the seller. As a consequence, we can no longer argue that the law should
strike down every contract where such consent is lacking, in order to
19 A range of remedies is in fact possible here, for the court could (a) strike down the entire
contract; (b) enforce the contract but strike out the objectionable clause; or (c) enforce the contract
but replace the objectionable clause with something more favourable to the buyer. While a good
deal could be said about the choice among these three remedial approaches, the main point (from
an economic perspective) is that the remedy chosen be sufficiently unfavourable to deter sellers
from engaging in such conduct.
20 See, for example, the contract involved in Gerhardt v. Continental Insurance Co., 48 N.J.
291, 225 A.2d 328 (1966).
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induce the seller to cure the problem by making the buyer more
informed. Such a rule would either induce the very explanations we are
trying not to induce (i.e., two days of explanations), or-if sellers decided
not to provide the two days of explanation anyway-it would invalidate
every clause in every form contract, thus preventing many buyers and
sellers from ever transacting. If the law is to protect buyers in this case,
therefore, the most it can do is invalidate any substantively unreasonable
clauses which have not been explained to the buyer, while permitting the
seller to enforce clauses whose substance seems reasonable. Just as, in
the sinking ship case, the court had to allow the collection of a
reasonable price even when the shipowner's agreement was arguably
coerced, so in this case the court must allow the enforcement of
reasonable terms even when the buyer's agreement was arguably
uninformed.
In short, from a remedial standpoint there are two relevant
categories of potential information problems, just as there were two
relevant categories of coercion. In the first, the problem can and should
be cured by the seller, so courts can strike down the resulting contract
without regard to its substance. In the second category, either the
problem cannot be cured at all (for example, nobody knows the
information in question), or the problem can be cured but only at a cost
that is not worth incurring, so it is a problem which (all things
considered) should not be cured. When a case falls in this category, the
law cannot strike down the contract without regard to the substance of
its terms, but can at most strike down those contracts whose substance is
unreasonable.
V. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
By "institutional competence," I mean the competence of courts
(or of any other institution) to evaluate the substance of a transaction in
an effort to decide whether its substantive terms are reasonable.
Obviously, this competence can only be judged relative to some standard
of substantive reasonableness, and I will not try to provide such a
standard here.2 1  Whatever standard one adopts, though-be it
efficiency, a "just price" theory, or any other approach-it is surely
possible for courts to do either well or poorly at applying that standard
to the facts of any particular case. My thesis is that the ability of courts
21 For a survey of possible standards, see Craswell, supra note 14 at 20-34. See also Freedom
of Contract, supra note 1 at 120.
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to apply such a standard well is crucial in deciding whether courts should
refuse to enforce contracts which fall into the second category of cases
discussed above. In particular, if courts cannot apply the substantive
standard very well, courts should enforce such contracts without trying to
evaluate their substance, in spite of the fact that the objecting party may
not have truly consented to the resulting obligation. In other words, in
this class of cases considerations of institutional competence should
trump concerns about the validity of the objecting party's consent.
A Institutional Competence and the Choice of Remedy
The reason why institutional competence is relevant only in the
second category of cases should by now be obvious. In the first category
of cases-cases of fraud, duress, etc., where sellers can and should
correct whatever problem it is that invalidates the buyer's consent-I
have argued that courts should refuse to enforce unconsented-to
contracts without regard to the contracts' substantive terms. Clearly,
then, courts' ability to evaluate the contracts' substantive terms will be
irrelevant in this first category of cases.
In the second category of cases, though-the sinking ship, the
monopoly seller, and (arguably) the standard form contract, where it is
impractical to expect the seller to correct the conditions that invalidates
the buyer's consent-I have argued that courts should refuse to enforce
the contract only if the substantive terms are unreasonable. In this
category, courts' ability to perform such a substantive evaluation is
critical to any decision about the appropriate remedy. In particular, if
the terms courts select as substantively reasonable are likely to be worse
than the terms selected by sellers would have been (according to
whatever standard of reasonableness we have adopted), then the system
will work better if courts simply enforce the contracts as written. Thus,
there can easily be some set of cases where courts should enforce a
contract notwithstanding the fact that the objecting party did not
meaningfully consent.
For example, consider the case of a poor consumer buying a
necessary product (food or clothing) from a monopoly seller. In such a
case, the consumer's only alternative to agreeing to the monopolist's
terms is to do without the product in question, and let us assume we hold
a philosophical theory of coercion which treats this choice as essentially
involuntary. Suppose, however, that the monopoly cannot practicably be
eliminated-say, because it is a natural monopoly, or because breaking
up the monopoly would cause even worse problems for antitrust or
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patent policy. In other words, suppose the case falls into my second
category, where no one would suggest that we strike down every contract
offered by the monopolist (as that would prevent the monopolist and the
consumer from transacting at all). Finally, suppose that the only term
anyone objects to is the price of the product. That is, suppose the
monopolist offers warranties and other terms which everyone would
concede are reasonable, but that she takes advantage of her monopoly
position to charge an extremely high price.
22
What this means is that, if courts are going to evaluate the
substance of the monopolist's terms, they must take on the functions of a
price regulator. It is well-known, however, that deciding what price a
monopolist should charge is far from easy. In the case of many
monopolies (telephone service, electricity, etc.), specialized agencies are
established to regulate the monopolist's price. These agencies usually
have staffs of economists and accountants to evaluate the monopolist's
costs, as well as elaborate fact finding procedures to gather the necessary
data-yet even these agencies are often unsuccessful
23 If it is this hard
for specialized agencies to determine a reasonable price, the task is
likely to be even harder for a common-law court.
Of course, even if we admit that courts will not be particularly
good at this task, this by itself does not establish that it would be better
for courts not to try. The key question here is one of relative institutional
competence: How good will courts' decisions be compared with the
decisions that would emerge if courts didn't even try to regulate prices?
In other words, how good are the prices likely to be set by courts,
compared to the prices likely to be set by an unregulated monopolist?
24
The inefficiencies of unconstrained monopoly pricing are well-known to
economists, so it is conceivable that courts-imperfect as they
are-might still do a better job than the unregulated market. (My own
guess is to the contrary, as the record of specialized agencies is not one
that inspires confidence.) My only point here is that it is exactly this sort
22 As I discuss below, most of the relevant considerations would be the same if the
monopolist's non-price terms (warranties, creditors' remedies, etc.) were what buyers objected to.
23 See, generally, P.L. Joskow & R.C. Noll, "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An
Overview" in G. Fromm, ed., Studies in Public Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981) 1 at
1; and G.J. Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1975) c. 5.
24 Of course, a third alternative is to set up a specialized regulatory commission. But if no
such commission has yet been established for any given monopolist, it will be beyond the power of
any court to create such a commission, so the court's choice will effectively be limited 
to (a)
attempting to regulate the monopolist's price itself, or (b) enforcing the monopolist's contract
without regard to the price charged.
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of judgment-i.e., an empirical judgment about relative institutional
competence-that is required to decide whether judicial scrutiny of the
substance of the monopolist's contract is superior to simply enforcing
the contract as written.
A similar analysis can be applied to cases where the objection is
to some non-price term-say, the warranty the seller offers,25 or the
remedies the seller reserves if the buyer defaults on a credit sale.26 As
Trebilcock notes, objectionable clauses of this sort are more likely to
result from imperfect information than from monopoly power,27 but this
does not alter the analysis significantly. For example, suppose that all
sellers of a certain good use fine-print contracts which buyers
(rationally) do not read-and suppose that we have decided that buyers'
consent to the resulting contract cannot be considered truly informed,
under our best philosophical theory of informed consent. Suppose,
however, that we have also decided that it is not worth it to spend the
time that would be necessary to cure this problem by explaining every
contract term to buyers. As discussed above, this conclusion eliminates
the possibility of striking down every unexplained term, for that would
effectively prevent these sellers and buyers from entering into any
enforceable contract whatsoever. Instead, the best courts can do (if they
are to strike down any contracts at all) is to prevent the sellers from
enforcing substantively unreasonable terms that have not been explained
to buyers, while still allowing enforcement of any fine-print terms that
pass a substantive reasonableness test.
It might seem that evaluating non-price terms, such as warranties
or penalties for breach, would be easier than trying to evaluate the price
a seller charges. In my view, though, regulating a seller's non-price
terms raises difficulties at least as great as those raised by any attempt to
regulate a seller's prices. To begin with, any term that favours sellers
over buyers should have the effect of reducing the seller's costs (or
increasing the seller's revenue), thus holding down the price the seller
must charge. To turn this point around, if a court invalidates such a
clause then the seller's costs will go up (or her revenues will go down)
and buyers will eventually have to pay a higher price. Thus, part of the
reasonableness determination-under just about any theory of
substantive reasonableness-will require the court to estimate the extent
of the likely price increase, and to balance the gains buyers get from
25 For example, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
26 For example, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
2 7 Freedom of Contract, supra note 1 at 119.
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having the clause removed against the harm buyers suffer from having to
pay a higher price.
Moreover, balancing the benefits of removing the clause against
the costs of a higher price is a task fraught with complications. If
eliminating the clause creates more efficient incentives for sellers-for
example, if eliminating a warranty disclaimer gives the seller an incentive
to spend more on quality-control to reduce the rate of product
failure-the seller's costs will not increase as much as might otherwise be
anticipated, and the price increase will be correspondingly reduced.
However, altering the contract terms can also alter the buyers'
incentives-for example, extending the warranty might lead buyers to
take less care in maintaining the product, thus causing the price increase
to be larger than might otherwise have been expected (as well as
requiring more careful buyers to pay for the costs imposed by the less
careful). 28 Obviously, evaluating these sometimes conflicting effects will
not be easy. And the net benefits of most clauses will also depend on
buyers' degree of risk aversion-i.e., how much would buyers be willing
to pay up front to be protected from the consequences that a one-sided
clause might occasionally trigger? This, too, will usually be difficult to
assess.
To be sure, the fact that these tasks are difficult does not imply
they should never be attempted. As before, the key question is one of
relative institutional competence: Will the non-price terms selected by
courts be better or worse than the non-price terms likely to be selected
by sellers, given that the sellers will be constrained only by whatever
incentives the market provides? If consumers are not aware of the
clauses in question, market incentives to offer efficient clauses may be
relatively weak,29 so it is at least possible that courts might be able to do
a better job than the market would. My point is simply that it is this
relative institutional judgment-and not a philosophical theory of
voluntariness-that ought to determine whether courts should even
attempt this task. If judicial attempts to set reasonable terms for sellers
would end up making matters even worse-for example, if such attempts
would end up pricing too many consumers out of the market-then
28 For a discussion of this aspect of warranties, see G.L. Priest, "A Theory of the Consumer
Product Warranty" (1981) 90 Yale LJ. 1297.
29 For a formal model, see M. Spence, "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and
Producer Liability" (1977) 44 Rev. Econ. Stud. 561. Accessible, non-technical discussions can be
found in D. Kennedy, "Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, With Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power" (1982) 41 Md. L. Rev. 563 at 599-
604; V.P. Goldberg, "Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand" (1974) 17 J. L. & Econ.
461.
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courts should enforce the sellers' contracts as written in spite of the fact
that (by hypothesis) the buyers' consent was not informed or voluntary.
B. Institutional Competence in Trebilcock'sAnalysis
I believe this judgment about institutional competence is what
drives most of Professor Trebilcock's conclusions about the particular
examples he discusses. Sometimes this is quite explicit, as when he
concludes that courts should feel relatively free to step in when there is
an easy benchmark to use in assessing the reasonableness of clauses (for
example, if we can see what kind of clause is chosen by well-informed
consumers in a closely related market), but should defer to regulatory or
legislative solutions if no such benchmark is available.3 0 At other times,
Trebilcock suggests that he is relying on values or principles other than a
judgment of relative institutional competence. However, I find these
suggestions unpersuasive-or, perhaps more accurately, I find them
persuasive only to the extent that even they rest ultimately on
institutional competence concerns.
For example, one of Trebilcock's suggestions is that courts
distinguish between "situational monopolies," where the monopoly is
the temporary result of chance circumstances, and "structural
monopolies," where the monopoly is likely to be long-lasting.31 The
foundering ship case, where there happens to be only a single tug in a
position to rescue the ship, is a situational monopoly. Examples of
structural monopolies include natural monopolies, where economies of
scale require that the good or service be provided by a single firm; or
cases where the owner of unique skills (Michael Jordan) or of a unique
asset (the Penny Black stamp) is in a more-or-less permanent position to
earn a supracompetitive return. Trebilcock argues that courts should set
aside prices they feel are excessive in cases of situational monopoly,
especially when there is a convenient reference price for the courts to
use as a substantive benchmark.3 2 However, he also believes that courts
should enforce the monopolist's contract as written (or should defer to
specialized regulatory bodies) when the monopoly is structural.33
Part of Professor Trebilcock's rationale for this conclusion rests
3 0 Freedom of Contract, supra note 1 at 120 and note 35.
3 1 ibid. at 93-96.
32 Ibid. at 93-94.
33 1biL at 95-96 and 101.
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on the fact that a structural monopolist's power arises from a market
structure which "is exogenous to and precedes the particular
circumstances of the interaction between parties to a given exchange." 34
In Trebilcock's view, the focus of a theory of coercion in contract law
should "arguably" be limited to factors related to the particular
interaction between the two parties.35 He thus describes structural
monopolies as a form of market failure rather than a form of contracting
failure, and argues that only the latter should be dealt with by private
contract law.v6 In what seems to be a related argument, Trebilcock
notes that if structural monopolies are objected to on efficiency grounds
(as distinct from the possible distributive objections), the objection is
that the monopoly price will price some consumers out of the market.
He then points out that this loss is felt by people other than the two
parties to the disputed contract; 7 This suggests-although Trebilcock
never explicitly says so-that these losses, too, are not the proper
concern of a theory of contracts.
If this argument for the distinction between structural and
situational monopolies is meant as a free-standing argument, I do not
find it convincing. Even accepting Professor Trebilcock's
characterization of the efficiency objection to structural monopolies,
there are perfectly valid nonefficiency objections which can be made to
the distributive effects of structural monopolies (i.e., the high price
redistributes wealth from customers to the monopolist).38 These
distributive effects clearly are felt by the parties to the contract, and thus
would be within even Trebilcock's conception of the proper focus of a
theory of contracts. Moreover, it is hard to see why, as a matter of
principle, a theory of contracts should be limited to effects felt by the
two parties to the contract being examined. Indeed, Trebilcock himself
does not follow this narrow view of contracts in any systematic way.
When evaluating compulsory disclosure laws, for example, Trebilcock is
quite prepared to consider the effect a disclosure law would have on the
incentive of all similarly-situated parties to gather information in the
34 Ibid at 95.
35Ibid.
3 6 Ibid. at 101.
3 7 IbaL at 92.
38 The history of these distributional objections is nicely reviewed in R.H. Lande, "Wealth
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged" (1982) 34 Hastings L.J. 65.
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future.39 But if these effects beyond the immediate parties to a contract
can properly be considered, why not also consider the third-party
efficiency consequences of a structural monopolist's price?
Perhaps for these reasons, Trebilcock ultimately grounds his
distinction between structural and situational monopolies on the
"pragmatic considerations of relative institutional competence" 4 0 to
which I alluded earlier. In Trebilcock's view, the telling argument is that
the procedures established for litigating two-party disputes do not equip
courts to gather the information needed to determine the price that a
situational monopolist should be allowed to charge, so such matters are
best left to more specialized regulatory bodies. 41 In the case of
situational monopolies, like the tug in a position to rescue the
foundering ship, Trebilcock argues that specialized regulatory bodies are
unlikely to be established,42 thus making the argument for judicial
intervention somewhat stronger.
This seems to me to be a much sounder basis on which to rest the
distinction between situational and structural monopolies. To be sure,
an analysis of institutional competence will not necessarily support the
exact distinction for which Trebilcock argues: I can imagine structural
cases where courts might be quite capable of intervening and situational
cases where it might be rather more difficult. For example, consider
Trebilcock's argument that, in cases of situational monopolies such as
the foundering ship case, courts can look to the reference price charged
under normal conditions as a guide to the price that is substantively
reasonable. But reference prices may also be available in structural
monopoly cases-for example, if there were only one tug company
conducting normal operations in a given port because of the small size of
the market, or because of a shortage of trained pilots. In such a case, the
court might still be able to use the prices charged by other tug companies
in more competitive ports as a reference to determine a reasonable price
for the monopoly tug company to charge. Due allowance would have to
39 Freedom of Contract, supra note 1 at 106-15 (discussing A.T. Kronman, "Mistake,
Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts" (1978) 7 J. Legal Stud. 1). Compare P. Benson,
"Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and
Contemporary Contract Theory" (1989) 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1077 at 1129-33 (objecting to the fact
that Kronman's analysis requires assessing the effect of a legal rule on all transactions, not just on
the particular transaction being litigated).
4 0 Freedom of Contract, ibid at 101.
4 1 Ibid
42 Ibid. at 95 ("situational monopolies, precisely because they are so time, place, and party
specific, are unlikely to attract the attention of institutions concerned with more enduring forms of
structural market power").
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be made for any differences between the two ports, of course-but
allowance for differences must also be made in many situational
monopoly cases. In the foundering ship case, for example, evidence
establishing the market price for normal tug services might not be
sufficient to let the court determine an appropriate price for rescue
services supplied during an unusually violent hurricane. It is not obvious
that calculating the appropriate adjustment is systematically harder for
the structural monopoly than it is for the situational monopoly.
A similar point can be made about Trebilcock's suggestion that,
if no convenient reference price is available, the court may be able to
determine a reasonable price for a situational monopolist by measuring
the situational monopolist's costs, and allowing her to cover her costs
plus a normal profit margin.43 While this might indeed be a sensible
strategy in a situational monopoly case, the same strategy could also be
used in a structural monopoly case (for example, the tug company with a
natural monopoly over normal operations in a given harbor). In these
cases, the key to the institutional competence issue is the ease or the
difficulty the court would face in establishing the tug company's costs
and determining a normal rate of profit. This difficulty is not affected by
whether the tug company's monopoly is situational or structural.
In short, my own sense is that close attention to institutional
competence would support a much more finely-drawn distinction than
Professor Trebilcock's rough line between situational and structural
monopolies. But this is a point on which reasonable minds may differ,
especially once the difficulty of administering finely-drawn lines is taken
into account. My main point is simply that this judgment about
institutional competence is just what ought to determine the appropriate
legal remedy in the category of cases I have been discussing here. In this
respect, Professor Trebilcock and I are in complete agreement.
VI. POSSIBLE DEONTOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS
At this point, a summary is in order. On the view I have
presented, questions about the nature of the objecting party's consent
will not even have to be asked in one subset of cases, as those questions
will become moot once the choice of remedies has been addressed. For
example, if courts are not well-suited to evaluate a monopolist's prices or
a credit seller's standard-form terms, I argued that courts should enforce
those contracts even if the best philosophical theory of consent would tell
43 Ib at 94.
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us that the buyer's consent was not really voluntary, or was not
sufficiently informed. In these cases, then, it is unnecessary to worry
about whether the buyer's consent was voluntary.
It might be argued, though, that my position passes too quickly
over the moral arguments that undergird the autonomy-based theory of
contracts. After all, the fact that it might be better (from some
instrumental standpoint) if courts were to enforce certain contracts does
not by itself establish that enforcement is morally justifiable. A key
premise of autonomy-based theories is that it is unjust to hold a party to
a contractual obligation to which he did not consent. Someone who
holds this position strongly enough might simply deny the permissibility
of enforcing contracts which had not been consented to, even if that
position would require courts to take on a task they were not well-suited
to perform. Institutional incompetence would of course be unfortunate,
such a person might argue, but the merely instrumental costs of
incompetent performance cannot (on this view) justify holding someone
to an obligation to which he never consented.
One possible response to this argument is to suggest that
unconsented-to obligations could be relabelled and enforced as
something other than "contractual" obligations. After all, even the
strongest backers of autonomy-based theories recognize that there are
other bases for civil liability which do not require a party's consent (tort
law, for example). 44 If this sort of relabelling would satisfy autonomy
theorists, I certainly have no objection to changing the labels.
The autonomy-based argument is more interesting, however, if it
is taken as an argument that it would be unjust to enforce such an
unconsented-to obligation under any label. That is, while it is true that
there are other bases for civil liability besides consent, those other bases
are not unlimited or infinitely flexible, and many of the obligations I
have been discussing here do not fit easily into any of the standard
categories such as tort (i.e., liability for wrongful acts) or restitution
(liability for benefits received and unjustly retained). If unconsented-to
obligations cannot be justified on any of these noncontractual grounds,
and if (by hypothesis) they cannot be justified on the contractual ground
of consent, it might be argued that the enforcement of those obligations
is morally unjustifiable regardless of any instrumental arguments that
might be put forward. This is the deontological objection to which I now
turn.
The first point to note is that, if courts are not very good at
deciding what clauses are substantively "unreasonable," the costs of
44 See Fried, supra note 2, c. 5.
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judicial errors will fall largely on consumers. In other words, the costs of
judicial incompetence may be "merely instrumental," but those costs will
generally be borne by the very parties courts are trying to protect.
45 To
be sure, this assertion is a slight oversimplification, since the exact
incidence of costs will depend on a variety of economic factors. The
most important complications arise when consumers differ in the value
they place on the objectionable clause and/or in their willingness to pay
for the product, in which case it is entirely possible for some consumers
to gain while others lose.4 6 In general, though, the effect of judicial
errors will be to injure at least some of those that judicial scrutiny of
contract terms is intended to protect. The particular consumer who
litigates may end up better off, of course, but future consumers as a class
will pay the price.
Now, an autonomy theorist could argue that this effect is still
morally irrelevant. If one believes that justice must be done even though
the heavens fall, and if justice forbids enforcing an obligation against
someone who has not consented to it, then perhaps courts should not
enforce such obligations even if non-enforcement is likely to make the
objecting parties as a class worse off in material terms. Still, I would
argue that this notion of justice is not an appropriate one to apply to
questions of contract enforceability. Here, too, I think the problem is
that too little attention has been paid to the remedy courts must use
when consent is found to be lacking.
An example may help illustrate my claim. We all agree (I
assume) that robbery is immoral, and that it would normally be unjust to
force a property-owner to yield up his property to the robber. This
premise, too, can be cast in autonomy terms: the property-owner has not
consented to the transfer of his property, so such a transfer should not
be enforced. It hardly follows, however, that any procedure designed to
remedy such robberies is ipso facto morally permissible. Still less does it
follow that any procedure designed to remedy robbery is morally
required, to the extent that it would be illegitimate for the state not to
adopt that procedure. Suppose, for example, that we could create a
special SWAT team capable of dropping 200 pounds of explosives on any
robber while the robbery is in progress (thus destroying the victim as well
45 This is the "double bind" referred to by Trebilcock in Freedom of Contract, supra note 1 at
98 and 100 (citing MJ. Radin, "Market-Inalienability" (1987) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849).
46 R. Craswell, "Passing On the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-
Seller Relationships" (1991) 43 Stan. L. Rev. 361 at 372-84. Notice, though, that the effect on
consumers does not depend simply on how much of the sellers' costs are passed on in the form of
higher prices, or on the slope of the supply and demand curves: see ibid. at 383.
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as the robber). I think all would concede this to be a very strange way of
protecting victims' autonomy interests. Certainly no one would contend
that the autonomy principle entitled victims to the "protection" of such a
system, or that it would be morally unjust for the state to refuse to
employ the SWAT team's capabilities. In this example, at least, it seems
perfectly proper to take account of the "institutional competence" of the
available mechanisms before deciding whether to protect autonomy
interests in any particular way.
Does it matter that; while future consumers as a class might be
hurt by incompetent decisions, the particular consumer who challenges
the contract in court could still end up better off? That is, can it be
argued that justice requires that this consumer's autonomy be respected,
regardless of the cost to other consumers in the future? This seems to
me to be a difficult position to maintain. Suppose that the SWAT team in
my example can use a "slightly smart bomb" which will spare the victim,
but will destroy the robber and five or ten innocent bystanders. It is
difficult to argue that the autonomy interests of the victim are
categorically more important than the costs which will be felt by
bystanders-especially since those costs entail a rather severe restriction
of the bystanders' own autonomy. (Although the effect is less drastic,
higher prices paid by future consumers can reduce their autonomy too,
especially if it prices them out of the market for essential products.
Thus, there are autonomy concerns on both sides of this balance as
well.)
A better response for an autonomy theorist might be to
distinguish sins of omission from sins of commission. That is, if the state
refuses to employ my SWAT team, it may be failing to protect robbery
victims' autonomy, but at least it would not be affirmatively infringing
their autonomy. (The affirmative infringement in this case would come
from the robber, not from the state.) By contrast, if the state refuses to
set aside unconsented-to contracts, the state-by affirmatively enforcing
such a contract-would then be playing an active role in infringing the
victim's autonomy. If one believes that actively causing harm is
categorically worse than merely failing to prevent harm4 7 it might still be
possible to argue that it is morally illegitimate for the state to enforce
contracts if the victim has not properly consented.
On closer analysis, however, even this distinction cannot be
47This distinction has a long (and, of course, controversial) history in moral philosophy. For
recent discussions see, for example, S. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialisin (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994); W.S. Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of
Doing and Allowing" (1989) 98 Phil. Rev. 287.
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sustained. More precisely, it might be sustainable for those categories of
coercion where the best remedy is to refuse to enforce all contracts,
regardless of their substantive terms, but it cannot be sustained in the
other category of cases, where the best remedy is to refuse enforcement
only if the contract's substantive terms are unreasonable. Recall the
problem: if the coercion cannot practicably be corrected by the seller, a
remedy which denied enforcement to all unconsented obligations would
effectively make transacting impossible, thus advancing no one's
autonomy. If the state limits its role to protecting victims against
unreasonable substantive terms, however, this means that the state will
then be actively enforcing some obligations: substantively reasonable
obligations will be enforced in spite of the absence of meaningful
consent. At this point, then, the state is not merely failing to prevent
infringements of autonomy but is actively contributing to those
infringements, so the analogy to the SWAT team becomes relevant again.
That is, if judicial attempts to evaluate substantive terms end up making
things worse for the class of parties we are trying to protect, it can no
longer be argued that it would be unjust to withhold this sort of
,'protection."48
This suggests that, if an autonomy theorist wishes to argue
against the enforcement of unconsented-to contracts, he or she must bite
the bullet and argue that the nonenforcement principle should extend
even to contracts whose substance is reasonable, and even to cases
where the impediments to valid consent cannot practicably be cured.
This position would be logically consistent, but it would also be
extremely unattractive. As discussed earlier, this position implies that
the owner of the foundering ship would not be able to sign any
enforceable contract, so rescuers could never count on getting paid for
their services. And if poverty or lack of education are treated as vitiating
informed consent,49 this position implies that poor consumers (or
poorly-educated ones) would also be unable to sign an enforceable
contract. This result would carry the distinction between causing harm
and failing to prevent harm to an unacceptable extreme. The effect
would be to block parties from signing necessary, perhaps even life-
48 Another way to put this point is to note that whatever factors invalidated the buyer's
consent to the transaction originally proposed by the sellers will also invalidate the buyer's consent
to whatever transaction is substituted by the court. For example, if the buyer's consent to the
original contract lacked validity because the only alternative to the contract was to do without vital
goods or services, the transaction substituted by the court (with what presumably will be more
favourable terms) will be equally unconsented-to, because the buyer's only choice will still be to
accept the new terms or do without the vital goods or services. See Craswell, supra note 14 at 35-38.
49 Compare the arguments discussed in Freedom of Contract, supra note 1 at 97-98.
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saving contracts-and to do so in the name of protecting those parties'
autonomy.
In practice, of course, few if any theorists would support such an
extreme result. In some cases, the "re-labelling" option discussed earlier
may prove attractive, thus permitting the creation and enforcement of
substantively reasonable obligations under some category other than
contract. For example, the rescuing tug company and the seller who
provides goods to poor consumers might be allowed to recover a
reasonable charge for their services under the name of restitution,5 0 and
when the obligation is placed under that name the fact that the other
party has not validly consented may seem less troubling. Others may be
able to avoid the problem by limiting their definitions of "coercion" to
conditions that can and should be cured by the seller-outright fraud,
classic duress, etc.-thereby eliminating the problem category in which
meaningful consent is lacking but reasonable substantive terms must
nonetheless be enforced. If one's theory of coercion permits this result,
autonomy theories can then coexist quite easily with the institutional
competence concerns considered here.51
VII. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion is not meant to show that instrumental
analyses are always right while deontological ones are always wrong, or
that philosophical theories of consent have no place in contract law, or
to establish anything else of so global a nature. Such an assertion would
not only be wildly out of spirit with Professor Trebilcock's book; it could
also be easily challenged. Indeed, the view I have presented here leaves
open the possibility that philosophical theories of consent may well have
a role to play in those categories where the impediments to valid consent
can and should be corrected by the party now seeking enforcement.
. Instead, my claims here are more modest. First, any analysis of
coercion or informed consent must pay some attention to the remedy to
be granted if meaningful consent is found to be lacking. This is true
regardless of whether the analysis is consequentialist,
nonconsequentialist, or anything else. To assume that contracts which
are not truly consented to can simply "not be enforced," without asking
what (if anything) will be enforced in their place, is to miss a large part
of the complexity of this problem.
5 0 See supra note 16.
51 See, for example, Epstein, supra note 2.
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Second, any analysis of the proper remedy in cases where
consent is lacking must pay some attention to questions of institutional
competence. In particular, if courts are to strike down contracts whose
terms are substantively unreasonable, while allowing enforcement of
reasonable obligations, their ability to distinguish reasonable from
unreasonable obligations must be considered. Moreover, competence of
this sort must be considered regardless of whether the reasonable
obligations are enforced under the label of contract or under some other
label such as restitution. Either way, if courts are going to determine
what counts as a reasonable price (or a reasonable warranty, or any
other term), the extent of courts' ability to do that job must surely have
some bearing on the propriety of their attempting it.

